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The Intersection of the Rule in Yerkey v
Jones and Contemporary AntiDiscrimination Law in Australia – Can the
‘Special Wives’ Equity Survive?
KENNETH YIN∗ AND MOSTAFA MAHMUD NASER ♦
Abstract

The High Court in Yerkey v Jones considered the enforceability
of a guarantee provided by a married woman to secure her
husband’s debts. Dixon J said that although the relationship of
husband and wife did not give rise to a presumption of undue
influence, the law had never been divested completely of ‘the
equitable presumption of an invalidating tendency’. Dixon J’s
formulation was essentially adopted by the majority justices in
Garcia v National Australia Bank and their judgment thus
represents the definitive endorsement of Dixon J’s view. Kirby
J on the other hand rejected ‘the stereotype underlying Yerkey’,
which he described as evidence of an ‘unprincipled
discriminatory category’.
This article advances the argument that the majority’s view of
wives was stereotypical and accordingly would be inconsistent
with the principles of contemporary sex discrimination laws
which prohibit discrimination based on the assumption of
stereotypical views. This inconsistency will be explored by first
discussing the propositions that underpinned the Yerkey and
Garcia, and by comparing them with the treatment of those
propositions in contemporary discrimination law.
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INTRODUCTION

The High Court in Yerkey v Jones (‘Yerkey’) 1 considered whether a
guarantee provided to a bank by a married woman to secure the debts
of her husband should be enforceable. Dixon J stated that although the
relationship of husband and wife did not give rise to a presumption of
undue influence, the relationship of husband and wife had ‘never been
divested completely of what may be called equitable presumption of an
invalidating tendency’. 2
This article traces the treatment of Dixon J’s views in Yerkey via the
seminal judgment of the High Court of Garcia v National Bank Ltd.
(‘Garcia’), 3 focusing on the proposition that Dixon J’s reasoning in
Yerkey v Jones and of the Garcia majority amounted to a stereotyped
view of married women. The idea that the views of Dixon J in Yerkey
and of the Garcia majority amounted to a stereotyped role of wives is
not in itself novel, and this part of the article serves primarily as an
introduction to our more nuanced proposition, that such a stereotyped
view of married women is in direct conflict with contemporary
principles of sex discrimination, particularly s 39 of the AntiDiscrimination Act 1977 (NSW) (NSWADA) 4 and equivalent
provisions. 5 To that end, this article explores two significant cases of
marital status discrimination, Waterhouse v Bell (‘Waterhouse’) 6 and
Boehringer Ingelheim Pty Ltd v Reddrop (‘Boehringer’). 7 Both were
decisions of the New South Wales Court of Appeal and, crucially, Kirby
P (as he was), who ultimately disagreed with the Garcia majority,
presided in Waterhouse.
This article next explores whether the stereotyped view of married
women expressed by Dixon J in Yerkey and the Garcia majority can
survive if directly confronted with contemporary principles in sex
discrimination law. This article posits that this view is incompatible
with those principles.
The article is divided into the following parts:
Part II introduces a simplistic definition of ‘stereotype’ which
straddles the views underpinning Dixon J’s judgment in Yerkey and the
Garcia majority’s perspective of married women, as well as the
proscription of marital status discrimination in sex discrimination law.
1
2
3
4
5

6
7

(1939) 63 CLR 649 (‘Yerkey’).
Ibid 675.

Garcia v National Bank of Australia (1998) 194 CLR 395 (‘Garcia’).
Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), s 39 (‘NSWADA’).
See Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), ss 5, 6, 7D(1); Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW),
ss 24, 39; Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic), ss 6-9; Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), ss
7-11; Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA), s 29; Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA), ss 8-10;
Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas), ss 14-16; Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT), ss 7, 8; AntiDiscrimination Act 1996 (NT), ss 19, 20.
(1991) 25 NSWLR 99 (‘Waterhouse’).
(1984) 2 NSWLR 13 (‘Boehringer’).
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In Part III, Dixon J’s views in Yerkey v Jones are introduced,
followed by a discussion of the treatment of his reasoning by the Garcia
majority. This part next explores whether the Yerkey v Jones principle
has always been accurately understood and applied. In particular, we
identify cases where courts applied a flawed understanding of the
Yerkey v Jones Principle so that those cases can be excluded from our
subsequent discussion whether the application of the Yerkey v Jones
principle does in truth give expression to marital status discrimination.
Part IV explores the argument that it would amount to marital status
discrimination under contemporary sex discrimination laws to treat a
woman less favourably because of some characteristic generally
imputed to them. A detailed analysis of the reasoning that underpinned
Waterhouse v Bell 8 and Boehringer Ingelheim Pty Ltd v Reddrop, 9 two
important cases of marital status discrimination, will be conducted,
focusing on the argument that the relevant ‘characteristic’ attracting the
prohibition on marital status discrimination was that a married woman’s
will was overborne by her husband and that this characteristic resulted
solely from the fact of her being married.
In part V, the article advances the proposition that the Garcia
majority’s view of the Yerkey v Jones principle amounted to
stereotyping which would be proscribed as marital status discrimination
under sex discrimination legislation. The broad scope of Australian sex
discrimination law will be probed.
The conclusion explores the hypothesis that the Yerkey v Jones
principle, despite criticisms of its being ‘anachronistic’, has never been
expressly confronted with the argument that it is categorically
incompatible with principles of marital status discrimination. The
article offers a prognosis of the outcome of such a hypothetical
confrontation if it arises.
II

UNDERSTANDING ‘STEREOTYPING’

An understanding of ‘stereotyping’ is needed to appreciate that
stereotyping underpins both the rationalisation leading to what
ultimately was a remedy for the married woman pursuant to the Yerkey
v Jones principle as well as the proscription of marital status
discrimination under relevant sex discrimination legislation. A
rudimentary understanding is enough for these limited purposes.
A ‘stereotype’, by one definition, is ‘a generalized view or
preconception of attributes or characteristics possessed by, or the roles
that should be performed by, members of a particular group’. 10 Brems
8
9
10

Waterhouse (n 6) 99.
Boehringer (n 7) 13.

Rebecca J Cook and Simone Cusack, Gender Stereotyping: Transnational Legal Perspectives
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010) 9.
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and Timmer explained that ‘stereotypes assign certain roles and
characteristics to a group. Examples include the notions that women
are nurturing and weak, men combative and powerful, and gays
promiscuous and unsuited to parenting’. 11 Such stereotypes ‘restrict
people to supposed group characteristics’ and are likely to erode their
‘dignity and personal autonomy’. 12
Thus, a stereotype, at its most simplistic, is a preconception of the
subject’s attributes. 13 Particularly with women, Evatt J had described a
‘stereotype’ as an ‘assumption about their status and capabilities’. 14
Such ‘assumptions’ may lead to ‘inequality and discrimination’ and
thereby subvert the enjoyment of certain human rights. 15 Notably,
several human rights instruments have imposed obligations on state
parties to combat ‘stereotyping’ 16 including the United Nations

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (‘CEDAW’) which requires state parties to modify ‘social and

cultural patterns of conduct’ that are based on ‘stereotyped roles for men
and women’. 17 Australia signed the CEDAW on 17 July 1980, and thus
invoked international obligation to implement the rights enunciated in
the Convention. Since then, Australia has developed many mechanisms
for giving effect to the rights within the Convention, and the adoption
of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) (‘SDA’) is considered one of
the significant steps to that direction. 18 This objective is explicitly
stated in the s 3 of the SDA that one of its main aims is to ‘give effect
to certain provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women’. 19

11
12
13
14
15
16

17
18

19

Eva Brems and Alexandra Timmer (eds), Stereotypes and Human Rights Law (Intersentia,
2016) 1.
Alexandra Timmer, ‘Toward an Anti-Stereotyping Approach for the European Court of
Human Rights’ (2011) 11(4) Human Rights Law Review 707, 709.
Ibid 714.
Elizabeth Evatt, ‘Equality and Gender Bias in the Law’ (1993) 65 Reform1, 2.
Brems and Timmer (n 11) 1.; Timmer (n 12) 709.
See The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, open
for signature 18 December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force 3 September 1981)
(‘CEDAW’) art 5(a); The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for
signature 30 March 2007, 2515 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008 (‘CRPD’) art 8(b);
The Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women
and Domestic Violence, opened for signature 11 May 2011, CETS No 210 (‘Istanbul
Convention’), arts 12 and 14.
CEDAW art 5(a). See also art 10(c).
Australian Human Rights Commission, ‘Women of the World – CEDAW and the Sex
Discrimination Act’, Woman of the World – Know Your International Human Rights (Web
page, 28 July 2019) <https://www.humanrights.gov.au/our-work/woman-world-cedaw-andsex-discrimination-act#8>.
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) s 3.
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III THE DISTILLATION OF THE YER K EY V JON ES
PRINCIPLE
The facts in Yerkey v Jones 20 were that John Yerkey and his wife Mary
brought an action in the Supreme Court of South Australia against
Florence Jones and her husband, Estyn Jones for principal and interest
secured by a memorandum of mortgage. Mrs Jones alleged undue
influence on the part of the plaintiffs and her husband acting together
and on the part of her husband separately.
Undue influence was not found. Nonetheless, Dixon J, said that the
law had never been divested completely of an equitable presumption of
an invalidating tendency, 21 and propounded that a married woman’s
guarantee was liable to be set aside under the following circumstances:
[I]f a married woman’s consent to become a surety for her husband’s debt
is procured by the husband and without understanding its effect in essential
respects she executes an instrument of suretyship which the creditor accepts
without dealing directly with her personally, she has a prima facie right to
have it set aside. 22

Dixon J’s analysis is often referred to eponymously as the Yerkey v
Jones principle. 23 Under the Yerkey v Jones principle, a female whose

state of being married and no more is the primary basis to set aside a
guarantee that she executed to secure her husband’s debts. 24 Dixon J’s
view was described by Cheshire and Fifoot as readily showing
‘something close to undue influence’ even though, as the authors noted,
the relationship of husband and wife does not itself raise a presumption
of undue influence. 25
The High Court’s judgment in Garcia v National Australia Bank 26
contains the seminal contemporary Australian treatment of the Yerkey
v Jones principle.
The facts in Garcia were described as ‘fairly typical of this type of
case’. 27 The Garcias, a husband and wife, had executed a mortgage over
their home in favour of the bank, which secured all monies including
future guarantees that either of them might execute. Mrs Garcia was a
physiotherapist and found to be a capable woman. 28 Subsequently Mrs
20
21
22
23
24

25
26
27
28

Yerkey (n 1).

Ibid 675.
Ibid 683 (Dixon J) (emphasis added).
See Nick Seddon and Rick Bigwood, Cheshire & Fifoot Law of Contract (LexisNexis, 2017)
794.
See ibid 811-822. However, the majority noted that the principle applied in Yerkey v Jones
may find application to ‘long term publicly declared relationships short of marriage between
members of the same or of opposite sex’ Garcia (n 3) 404 (in the joint judgement of Gaudron,
McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ obiter).
Seddon and Bigwood (n 23) 778.
Garcia (n 3) 409.
Seddon and Bigwood (n 23) 782.
Garcia (n 3) 401.
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Garcia signed several guarantees to secure a loan to Mr Garcia for use
in his company; although a director, she had no involvement in the
management of the company. The couple subsequently separated, and
the company was wound up.
Mrs Garcia sought declarations that the various documents were of
no force or effect and relied on the Yerkey v Jones principle for relief.
Garcia like Yerkey thus concerned a married woman who had
guaranteed her husband’s debts and sought to be relieved of her
obligations under it.
The majority of the High Court in Garcia famously endorsed the
principles set out by Dixon J in Yerkey as ‘authoritative’, saying that
they were ‘particular applications of accepted equitable principles
which have as much application today’, 29 that a party having a legal
right should not be permitted to exercise it in a way that amounted to
unconscionable conduct. 30 In so doing, the Garcia majority focused on
that part of Dixon J’s judgment in Yerkey where he confronted the
proposition that ‘the only substantial or only ground for impeaching the
instrument is misunderstanding or want of understanding’ in which case
the reliance placed on the creditor for the purpose of informing the wife
what it was about must be of great importance. 31
The following is the pivotal passage of the Garcia majority’s
reasoning 32
(a) the wife (surety) did not understand the purport and effect of the
transaction; (b) the transaction was voluntary, in the sense that the surety
obtained no gain from the contract the performance of which was
guaranteed; (c) the creditor is to be taken to have understood that the wife
(as surety) may repose trust and confidence in her husband in matters of
business and therefore to have understood that the husband may not fully
and accurately explain the purport and effect of the transaction to his wife;
and (d) the creditor nonetheless did not itself take steps to explain the
transaction to the wife or find out that a stranger had explained it to her. 33

It is necessary to juxtapose Kirby J’s reasoning against that of the
Garcia majority to fully appreciate the purport of each. Kirby J, contrary
to the Garcia majority, focused on the nature of the particular
relationship, asking if it was one of emotional dependence on the part
of the surety, rather than assume that wives generally were vulnerable
or unable to take care of their own interests. 34 Kirby J described the
majority’s reasons as being a stereotyped view of married women,35 a
view we explore in detail in Part 4 below. Whilst acknowledging that
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Ibid 403.
Ibid 409; see also the discussion of this view at Seddon and Bigwood (n 23) 779.
Garcia (n 3) 406.
Ibid 420.
Ibid 395.
Ibid 427-28.
Ibid 424.
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the ‘stereotype underlying Yerkey may hold true for some, perhaps
even a significant number of, wives’ Kirby J opined that ‘this Court
should, where possible, refuse to ‘classify unnecessarily and
overbroadly by gender when more accurate and impartial’ principles
can be stated’. 36
Much confusion exists concerning the parameters of the Garcia
majority view of the Yerkey v Jones principle, in particular whether the
invalidation of the wife’s guarantee was because of undue influence or
if there was a separate, invalidating factor which operated in the
absence of undue influence, leading to a ‘voluminous’ body of
literature. 37 As Cheshire and Fifoot said:
The High Court’s decision in Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd. has not
made analysis of this area of the law (the identification of the parameters
of the Yerkey v Jones principle) any easier. First, it is not always clear
whether on the facts of any particular case, the principle is simply undue
influence or whether it is a separate, special principle. 38

To the above passage, the following footnote was added:
There is no doubt that it (the Yerkey v Jones principle) is treated as a
separate principle in some of the cases because the court has held that the
wife has no relief under other principles such as undue influence or
unconscionability.

Professor Elizabeth Stone alluded to the complications, following
Garcia, in identifying the precise parameters of the Yerkey v Jones
principle thus:
In other cases, the judgments have applied Garcia as if it were based on
principles of undue influence. The decision of the Queensland Court of
Appeal in ANZ Banking Group v Alirezai 39 is a good example of this
tendency to elide the quite different concepts of ‘trust and confidence’ and
undue influence. 40

The Yerkey v Jones principle amounts to the assumption of a stereotype,
which the Garcia majority had characterised as a situation where the
cause of the invalidation of the wife’s guarantee was no more than the
fact of her being married, what Cheshire and Fifoot had described as a
‘separate, special principle’. It is important to distinguish the
application of the Yerkey v Jones principle from the type of situation
which Kirby J had explored, where the cause of the invalidation of a

36
37

38
39
40

Ibid 427.
See eg Seddon and Bigwood (n 23) 778: ‘The exact reach of this (the Yerkey v Jones) principle
is not clear. It has excited a lot of attention in the last two decades or so’. See also Elizabeth
Stone, ‘The Distinctiveness of Garcia’ (2006) 22 Journal of Contract Law 170, 172.
Seddon and Bigwood (n 23) 778.
(2004) QCA 6. Cited in Stone (n 37) 184.
Stone (n 37) 184.
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wife’s guarantee should be the emotional dependence on the part of the
surety or some other invalidating factor. 41
Cases which invoke a conflated view variously of ‘trust and
confidence’, ‘undue influence’, and the fact that some invalidating
tendency arises from the fact of the wife’s being married, or some
combination of these, serve no useful purpose in demonstrating the
Yerkey v Jones Principle. The following passage from ANZ Banking
Group v Alirezai (‘Alirezai’), which Stone cites, lucidly shows this
conflation and the difficulties that arise because of it:
Special relationships of sufficient trust and confidence in which one party
could abuse that trust and confidence so as to invoke equitable relief for
transactions entered into by the other are not a closed category; they could,
for example, arise in some parent–child relationships or perhaps in the
relationship between a disabled person and carer; many other potential
examples can be envisaged. 42

McMurdo P’s judgment in Agripay Pty Limited v Byrne (‘Agripay’) 43
is to similar effect. McMurdo P commenced her discussion of Garcia
by setting out the majority’s judgment in full, 44 including the reference
to the High Court’s seminal observation that the invalidating aspect of
the wife’s guarantee was that the lender is to be taken to have
understood that, as a wife, the surety may repose trust and confidence
in her husband in matters of business. 45
Practically uno flatu, McMurdo P however also said:
There seems to be no sound reason why these principles should be limited
to wives entering into guarantees of their husbands' liabilities. Human
weaknesses and unconscionable conduct are not limited to heterosexual
marriage relationships. These legal principles should apply equally to all
vulnerable parties in personal relationships: see Kirby J's reasons in Garcia,
especially at 435 [83]… .

McMurdo P’s subtle conflation of the principles of ‘unconscionable
conduct’ arising from some perception of human weakness and
unconscionable conduct invalidating the wife’s guarantee and of the
Yerkey v Jones Principle is particularly confusing. Though her Honour
actually purported to rely on Kirby J’s reasoning in Garcia to underpin
her reasoning, Kirby J had himself disavowed the veracity of the Garcia
majority’s view of the Yerkey v Jones Principle, far less endorse its
application to ‘other relationships’. 46 Kirby J’s reasoning had focused
on the nature of the particular relationship, asking if it was one of
emotional dependence on the part of the surety, rather than assume the
41
42
43
44
45
46

Cf Garcia (n 3) 427 (Kirby J).
ANZ Banking Group Ltd v Alirezai, QCA 6, 9 [39] (‘Alirezai’).
[2011] QCA 85 (‘Byrne’).
Garcia (n 3) 375.
Byrne (n 44) 11.
Garcia (n 3) 428.
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inherent vulnerability of any generic class of guarantor, 47 whilst
acknowledging that the stereotype underlying Yerkey may hold true for
some, perhaps even a significant number of, wives. 48
Authentic undue influence cases on the other hand are those where,
axiomatically, the creditor was aware of the influence whereas in cases
which apply the reasoning of the Garcia majority, the wives’ guarantees
were sought to be impugned because of knowledge of the relationship,
and no more, on the part of the creditor. Bank of New South Wales v
Rogers (‘Rogers’) 49 is a clear example of the former type of case.
Whilst Rogers was not a case of a wife’s guarantee, it is proffered as a
lucid illustration of the type of reasoning in which it was knowledge of
the influence, not of any relationship without more, which tainted the
bank’s guarantee. The case thus usefully provides a clear contrast with
the reasoning of the Garcia majority. Relevantly, McTiernan J said:
The proof of [her] claim is twofold. It is necessary for her to prove that
Gardiner procured the securities to be given to the bank by undue influence
or other fraudulent means and that the [bank]…had notice either actual or
constructive that the securities were obtained by such means [emphasis
added]. 50

There is a telling contrast between the language in Rogers and the
Garcia majority. In Rogers, the influence exerted by the creditor was
the means by which the debtor had procured the securities, knowledge
of which influence then rendered their being vulnerable to be set aside.
The reasoning of the Garcia majority on the other hand did not invoke
any consideration of the exertion of any influence, rather the
invalidation of the wife’s guarantee was based on the assumption that
by reason of the marriage relationship, the wife would repose trust and
confidence in her husband and leave the business arrangements to
him. 51
By way of contrast, an illustration of a case which did starkly adopt
the reasoning of the Garcia majority was State Bank of New South
Wales Ltd. v Chia (‘Chia’). 52 From the outset, it was made clear that
the case did not turn on undue influence:
As Mr Evans (counsel) made clear in his opening, Mrs Chia does not claim
that the transaction was procured as a result of undue influence of her
husband. 53

Einstein J explained that the case before him invoked the requirement
in Garcia that by reason of the marriage relationship the wife would
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Ibid 427-428.
Cf Garcia (n 3) 427 (Kirby J).
[1941] 65 CLR 42 (‘Rogers’).
Ibid 61 (McTiernan J).
See Yerkey (n 1); Garcia (n 3).
(2000) 50 NSWLR 587 (‘Chia’).
Ibid 597.
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repose trust and confidence in the husband. 54 Rather than conflating 55
the aspects of influence and of trust and confidence, Einstein J
explained that the invalidating aspect of the wife’s guarantee was
knowledge of the marriage relationship rather than the exertion of
undue influence on the part of the husband.
The third requirement is knowledge on the part of the person taking the
security, that the guarantor is the wife of the debtor. 56

Chia thus represents an unequivocal endorsement and application of
the Garcia majority’s view of the Yerkey v Jones Principle.
Bank of Western Australia v Abdul 57 can similarly be analysed:
There is no question that Bankwest knew that the first and second
defendants were married. Consequently, Bankwest is ‘to be taken to have
understood that, as a wife, [Mrs Abdul] may repose trust and confidence in
her husband in matters of business and therefore to have understood that
[Mr Abdul] may not fully and accurately explain the purport and effect of
the transaction to his wife [emphasis added]. 58

The conjunctive ‘consequently’ is telling because it goes to the core of
the Yerkey v Jones Principle, that the knowledge of the relationship of
trust and confidence arises solely from knowledge of the marriage
relationship.
IV

THE ILLEGITIMACY OF THE STEREOTYPICAL
ASSUMPTION THAT A MARRIED WOMAN’S WILL
IS OVERBORNE IN AUSTRALIAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW

Waterhouse and Boehringer were both concerned with complaints of
discrimination by an employer under s 40(1) of the NSWADA. That

section makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a
person on the grounds of marital or domestic status.59 Section 39(1),
pivotal to both cases as providing the framework for a finding of
discrimination, is set out in full below:
(1) A person (‘the perpetrator’) discriminates against another person (‘the
aggrieved person’) on the ground of marital or domestic status if the
perpetrator:
(a) on the ground of the aggrieved person’s marital or domestic status
or the marital or domestic status of a relative or associate person of the
aggrieved person, treats the aggrieved person less favourably than in
the same circumstances, or in circumstances which are not materially

54
55
56
57
58
59

Ibid 598.
‘Eliding’ – per Stone (n 37) 59.
Chia (n 53) 601.

Bank of Western Australia v Abdul [2012] VSC 222 (‘Abdul’).
Ibid [63] referring to Garcia (n 3).
NSWADA (n 4) s 40(1).
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different, the perpetrator treats or would treat a person of a different
marital or domestic status or who does not have such a relative or
associate of the marital or domestic status, or
(b) requires the aggrieved person to comply with a requirement or
condition with which a substantially higher proportion of persons of a
different marital or domestic status, or who do not have a relative or
associate of that marital or domestic status, comply or are able to
comply, being a requirement which is not reasonable having regard to
the circumstances of the case and with which the aggrieved person does
not or is not able to comply.
(1A) For the purposes of subsection (1) (a), something is done on the ground
of a person’s marital or domestic status if it is done on the ground of the
person’s marital or domestic status, a characteristic that appertains
generally to persons of that marital or domestic status or a characteristic
that is generally imputed to persons of that marital or domestic status.

The various Commonwealth and State Acts which address marital
status discrimination contain similar wording.60
The expression ‘stereotype’ is not defined in the NSWADA or
equivalent provisions, 61 and it is to case law that we turn to determine
its materiality, if any, to marital status discrimination. Relevantly,
Mahoney JA explained in Boehringer 62 that the definition of marital
status discrimination in s 39(1) of the NSWADA covered not just the
status of being married, but characterised s 39 as being a ‘formula’ for
a finding of discrimination based on a ‘stereotyped characterisation’ of
a married person, saying in the following pivotal passage:
S 39(1) in effect expands the meaning of ‘marital status’ in 40(1): it extends
it so as to include not merely marital status, as defined by s 4(1), but also
the two characteristics specified in ss 39(1)(b) and 39(1)(c). The legislature
was, perhaps, moved to provide for this kind of extension in order to
prevent discrimination ‘based on stereotyped characterisations of’ persons
of particular sex or marital status: cf Phillips v Martin Marietta Corp 400
US 542 (1971) at 545 per Marshall J. But the legislature did not merely add
such characteristics to the meaning of marital statute; it also provided a
formula for determining whether there has been discrimination (emphasis
added). 63

The homogeneity with other equivalent State and Commonwealth
laws 64 makes Mahoney JA’s reasoning particularly useful.
The respondent in Boehringer, Mrs Redropp, had applied for a job
with the appellant. She was married to an employee of a competitor of
60
61
62
63

64

See (n 5) above.
See Ibid.
Boehringer (n 7) 12 (Mahoney JA) (emphasis added).
Ibid 18. Note that Mahoney JA referred to the then version of the NSWADA. Section 39 is
later revised while the essence of the section remains same for the purpose of the argument
formed here.
See (n 5).
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the appellant. When she did not obtain the position, she contended that
the appellant had discriminated against her on the grounds of marital
status. 65
The evidence of the parties in Boehringer conflicted in several
significant places, including the extent the fact of Mrs Redropp’s being
married to an employee of a competitor played in the decision not to
employ her.
The Equal Opportunity Tribunal considered that ‘marital status’ had
an ‘extended meaning’, including the status of being married to an
employee of a competitor. However, Mahoney JA explained that the
prohibition on ‘discrimination’ in the NSWADA was a reference to
discrimination based on the status of being married and did not include
‘discrimination based on the identity or situation of one’s spouse’. 66
Priestley JA explained that the prohibition on discrimination in sub
paragraph (a) was on discrimination ‘against a married person simply
because he is married and for no other reason’; 67 in sub paragraph (b)
‘against a married person because of some particular characteristic that
all or nearly all married persons have’; 68 and in sub paragraph (c) (now
repealed but essentially replicated within s 39(1A)) ‘against a married
person on the grounds of some particular characteristic which married
persons are generally believed to have whether or not they have it’. 69
Priestley JA’s comment concerning the then sub paragraph (c), ‘a
characteristic that is generally imputed to persons of his marital status’
is particularly significant, since it encompasses the notion that marital
status discrimination includes discrimination not only on the basis of
some actual characteristic possessed by wives, but also their assumed
characteristics.
Priestley JA further clarified:
I can see nothing in this which can justify a conclusion that BI’s decision
not to employ Mrs Redropp was wholly or partly on the ground of the
proneness to disclose confidences to their husbands which the tribunal
thought is generally imputed to married women. BI’s 70 decision not to
employ Mrs Redropp was on the ground of the possibility that she might
disclose whether by inadvertence or otherwise, confidential information of
BI to her competitor-employed husband (emphasis added). 71

65
66
67
68
69
70
71

Boehringer (n 7) 13–14; 29–31. (the latter passages containing useful observations on the
evidence).
Ibid.
‘his marital status’. This is in s 39(1A) in the current version of the Act.
‘a characteristic that appertains generally to persons of his marital status’ This is in s 39(1A)
in the current version of the Act.
‘a characteristic that is generally imputed to persons of his marital status’. This is in s 39(1A)
in the current version of the Act.
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His Honour then noted, crucially, that this ‘individual characteristic’
was not a characteristic within the meaning of s 39(1)(c) 72 and so found
that BI’s conduct did not amount to marital status discrimination.73
The finding that the decision not to employ Mrs Redropp was made
not on the basis of some generalised assumption concerning a
characteristic of married women meant that that decision did not result
from the adoption of a ‘stereotype’ in the sense explained by Mahoney
JA. 74 The idea that marital status discrimination must be underpinned
by the adoption of a stereotypical assumption concerning the
characteristics of married women rather than some individual
characteristic of the wife coheres with the several definitions of
‘stereotype’ explored earlier, 75 in particular Evatt J’s barbed comment
that with women, a stereotype is an assumption about their status and
capabilities. 76 Whilst Mahoney and Priestley JJA’s reasoning upon
reflection seems almost axiomatic, it is noteworthy that the Equal
Opportunity Tribunal had itself originally fallen into error in finding
that the appellant had offended s 39 of the NSWADA.
Contrary to Boehringer, the New South Wales Court of Appeal in
Waterhouse did find that marital status discrimination had been
committed under the same Act, the NSWADA. A comparison of the
respective findings in those cases furnishes us with insight into the
requirement of the satisfaction of a stereotypical assumption concerning
the characteristics of married women for marital status discrimination
to be found.
The plaintiff in Waterhouse was married to one Robbie Waterhouse.
She applied to the Australian Jockey Club for a trainer’s licence. Her
application was rejected because she was married to a person who was
warned off all races in Australia on a number of occasions due to his
involvement in a horse substitution scandal and who was notorious in
horse-racing circles.
A feature common to both Boehringer and Waterhouse, at a high
level of abstraction, was that the respective plaintiffs were married to
someone and the fact of their marriage to that person was a pivotal
consideration in the decision concerning the grievance for which they
sought redress. Clarke JA’s following question to himself in
Waterhouse serves as a prelude to an appreciation of the factual
differences between the two cases resulting in their ultimate different
outcomes: ‘The question which arises can be shortly stated: Was the

72
73
74
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76

In the version of the Act at the time. The same provision is now part of s 39(1A) of NSWADA.

Boehringer (n 7) 31.
Cf Waterhouse (n 6) 111, 114.
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Tribunal bound by Boehringer Ingelhaim Pty. Ltd. v Reddrop to dismiss
the plaintiff’s complaint?’ 77
At first instance, the Tribunal in Waterhouse, accepting that
Boehringer was authoritative, noted: first, that the sole reason that Mrs
Waterhouse was denied a trainer’s licence was because she was married
to Robbie Waterhouse, apparently notorious in racing circles; secondly,
that the denial to her of registration because she was married to Robbie
Waterhouse or because of an apprehension that she may be corrupted
by him, did not amount to marital status discrimination and Boehringer
could not be distinguished.
Clarke JA, though endorsing the reasoning of both Mahoney and
Priestley JJA in Boehringer, added the following crucial enquiries,
whether the first defendant acted as it did (in refusing Mrs Waterhouse’s
application for a trainer’s licence) because the plaintiff was married to
Robbie Waterhouse, and whether it believed that she, in common with
married women generally, was susceptible to the corrupting influence
of the husband. 78 Clarke JA, after carefully analysing the facts and
reasoning in Boehringer, opined that the pivotal aspect of Boehringer
which led to the finding in that case that BI had not engaged in marital
status discrimination was that:
the decision was grounded upon a characteristic which was particular to
Mrs Redropp (and not generally imputed to married women) that is that she
had a close relationship with an employee of a competitor. 79

Keeping Clarke JA’s observation at the forefront, the relevance of
various evidentiary aspects of Waterhouse becomes clearer.
The first of those evidentiary aspects was the evidence that the
personality of Mr Robbie Waterhouse was that he would be able to
persuade or influence his wife, to which his Honour added a brief gloss,
saying that a person might be capable of influencing others on many
matters but be quite incapable of corrupting that person; the second of
those evidentiary aspects was the observation that nothing critical was
said about the plaintiff herself, nor was there was anything in her makeup which rendered her vulnerable to a corrupting influence; the third of
those evidentiary aspects, and most significantly, was the evidence of
one Bell, the chairman of the Australian Jockey Club which was noted
in the judgement as follows:
When pressed as to why the plaintiff might be susceptible to the corrupting
influence of Robbie Waterhouse his clear and emphatic answer was that it
was because she was married to him. 80
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Absent any suggestion of a character deficiency on the part of the wife,
Clarke JA asked why the fact that the wife was married to a rogue meant
that she was liable to be corrupted by him. Clarke JA’s answer to his
own question was:
Because all wives are liable to be corrupted by their husbands. That is, that
corruptibility at the hands of one’s husband is a characteristic attributed or
generally attributed to all married women. A finding of this nature clearly
falls within s 39(1)(c) (emphasis added). 81

The reasoning in Boehringer and Waterhouse, juxtaposed, is that in the
former, marital status discrimination was not established because the
decision was underpinned by the fact that the wife was married to
employee of a competitor rather than some characteristic attributed to
married women generally whilst in the latter, marital status
discrimination was found because of the adoption of a stereotypical
generalisation concerning an attribute of married women, that they were
liable to be corrupted by their husbands.
Finally, we recount that Kirby J himself presided in Waterhouse.
This is significant given his subsequent role in Garcia, which we
explore below.
V IS THE YER K EY V JON ES PR IN CIPLE
INCOMPATIBLE WITH CONTEMPORARY SEX
DISCRIMINATION LAW?
In this part, we advance the argument that the Yerkey v Jones Principle
is at worst incompatible, and at best cannot co-exist comfortably, with,
the principles of contemporary sex discrimination law.
The word ‘stereotype’ is not actually mentioned in the Garcia
majority’s judgment and their decision was not based on the idea that
women were subservient or that they occupied an inferior economic
status, but rather on the unfairness that could flow from the relationship
of trust and confidence characterising the marriage relationship. 82 The
Garcia majority also disavowed any suggestion of an imbalance of
power between the genders, but, rather, stated that the Yerkey v Jones
Principle was a reflection of the trust and confidence each has in the
other. 83 Dixon J also had said in Yerkey itself that the marriage
relationship did not give rise to a presumption of undue influence. 84
Callinan J, who wrote a separate judgment to the Garcia majority,
stated that society’s recognition of the equality of the sexes had led to
rejection of the concept that the wife was subservient to the husband in

81
82
83
84

Ibid 114.

Garcia (n 3) 420.
See Yerkey (n 1); Garcia (n 3).
Yerkey (n 1) 675.
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the management of the family’s finances, 85 yet in the same paragraph
noted that ‘in a substantial proportion of marriages it is still the husband
who has the business experience and the wife is willing to follow his
advice without bringing a truly independent mind and will to bear on
financial decisions’. 86 Endorsing Dixon J’s judgment in Yerkey,
Callinan J also said:
For myself I would take the view that the principles stated by Dixon J have
now stood and been accepted for so long as the law in Australia...that they
should be taken as the law unless and until this Court has held or should
now hold to the contrary. 87

The argument that the reasoning of the Garcia majority that the wife,
because she is a wife, would ‘repose trust and confidence’ in the
husband amounts to a stereotypical assumption, has long been
propounded, and persists, with numerous commentators suggesting that
such reasoning is underpinned by various factors including: (a) the
married women’s will is generally overborne by their husband because
of the trust and confidence reposed on their husband; 88 (b) married
women are allowed to incur legal responsibilities ‘without taking
trouble to understand them which would normally be expected of any
adult’ while they are in marriage relationship, and it is excusable and
protected under the special wives’ equity; 89 and (c) a married woman
while acting as surety for her husband’s borrowings, is subservient to
him and suffers from financial ineptitude.90 Stone said that the marriage
relationship was one in which, by the reasoning of the Garcia majority,
ignorance of one’s own affairs is excusable and notorious (the emphasis
is reproduced from the article). 91 Finally, Cheshire and Fifoot opined
that the effect of the Garcia majority’s view was that the wife’s will was
‘more or less assumed to be overborne by her husband’. 92
By the same reasoning, Callinan J’s judgment would be considered
to adopt a stereotypical view of married women.
The judicial antecedent to the Garcia majority’s reasoning can be
readily located in Yerkey v Jones, namely Dixon J’s now celebrated
observation, virtually definitive of the Yerkey v Jones Principle itself,
that the relationship of husband and wife had never been divested fully
of an equitable presumption of an invalidating tendency. 93 This
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Tim Wright, ‘The Special Wives' Equity and the Struggle for Women's Equality’ (2006) 31(2)
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reasoning without more clearly reflects a stereotypical assumption of
the characteristics of married women.
In Garcia, concerning the question whether the views of the Garcia
majority were ‘stereotypical’, Kirby J said:
Rejecting discriminatory stereotypes:… A principle which accords to all
married women a ‘special equity’ based on their supposed need for
protection rests upon a stereotype of wives to which this Court should give
no endorsement. 94 All persons of full capacity, including married women,
should ordinarily conform to commercial transactions which they enter
unless statute or judicial law affords relief. Marriage, and being the female
member to a marriage, is not, as such, a relevant reason for relief from legal
obligations.

Kirby J explicitly characterised the Yerkey v Jones Principle (whose
adoption he expressly rejected) as being one where there was a
presumption that because of the ‘invalidating tendency’, a characteristic
of a security granted by a married woman in favour of her husband, a
court would be more ready to find that a husband had exercised undue
influence. 95
Garcia was a banking case; section 4 of the NSWADA explicitly
includes ‘banking’ in its definition of ‘services’ captured under that Act
as is the case with all equivalent state and territory anti-discrimination
laws. 96 The prohibition of discrimination in the provision of ‘services’,
including, relevantly, ‘banking’, is then specifically caught in s 47
NSWADA and equivalent state and territory legislation. 97
Kirby J then specifically confronted the question whether the
Yerkey v Jones Principle was incompatible with sex discrimination
legislation. 98
Unacceptable discrimination: There is a final reason for rejecting the
Since
1939,
special equity founded by Dixon J in Yerkey v Jones.

Australian society and its legal systems have moved away from irrelevant
discrimination, whether on the grounds of sex, matrimonial status or
otherwise. 99 Any modern expression of a ‘special equity’ by this court
94
95
96
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99
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Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) s 4; Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic) s 4; AntiDiscrimination Act 1991 (Qld) sch 1; Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA) s 4; Equal
Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) s 4; Sex Discrimination Act 1994 (Tas) s 4; The Dictionary to
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Act 1992 (ACT) s 20; Anti-Discrimination Act 1992 (NT) s 41.
Garcia (n 3) 427.
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), ss 5, 6, 70(1). See also Anti-Discrimination Act 1977
(NSW), ss 24, 39; Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vict). ss 6-9; Anti Discrimination Act 1991
(Qld), ss 7-11; Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA), s 29; Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA), ss
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Anti-Discrimination Act 1992 (NT), ss 19, 20. See Gregg v Tasmanian Trustees Ltd (1997)
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should similarly avoid unprincipled discriminatory categories. The
stereotype underlying Yerkey may hold true for some, perhaps even a
significant number of wives. But this Court should, where possible, refuse
to ‘classify unnecessarily and overbroadly by gender when more accurate
and impartial’ principles can be stated…
Although it is suggested that Yerkey may sometimes provide an
appropriate means to afford protection to a vulnerable person who happens
to be a wife, its expression is in my view completely unacceptable as a
principle of contemporary Australian law. It should be rejected not because
(as the Bank put it) it is demeaning to women but because it lends the
authority of this Court, and thus of Australian law, to an exposition of
principle which is completely inappropriate. 100

The Garcia majority view is frequently criticised as anachronistic and
controversial, as ‘the idea that a wife is more or less assumed to be
overborne by her husband is one that has attracted indignation,
agonising and recognition that this does still happen in this day and
age’. 101
Despite the frequently expressed laments that the Garcia majority’s
view is anachronistic and outdated, 102 Kirby J alone of the Garcia bench
considered the application of the Yerkey v Jones Principle to express a
principle that was stereotypical and not merely discriminatory but
categorically incompatible with Australian sex discrimination
legislation. As noted earlier in this paper, the expression ‘stereotype’ is
not actually defined in the NSWADA or equivalent provisions. 103 The
proscription on stereotyping as being discriminatory nonetheless is
however lucid in both Boehringer and Waterhouse since the reasoning
of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in both was underpinned by
an analysis of whether the decisions were made because of ‘some
particular characteristic which married persons are generally believed
to have’, 104 which Mahoney JA in Boehringer had explained as meaning
‘a stereotyped characterisation of persons of particular sex or marital
status.’ 105
The long title of the NSWADA states that it is: ‘An Act to render
unlawful racial, sex and other types of discrimination in certain
circumstances and to promote equality of opportunity between all

100
101
102
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73 FCR 91 at 114, per Merkel J (please note that this footnote is reproduced from the case
itself).
Garcia (n 3) 427-428.
Seddon and Bigwood (n 23) 779.
See Garcia (n 3) 399, 434; Warburton v Whiteley (1989) NSW Conv R s55-453, 58, 286-7
(New South Wales Court of Appeal) [Kirby P (as he then was)] (‘Warburton’); Wright (n 97);
Samantha Hepburn, ‘The Yerkey Principle and Relationship of Trust and Confidence: Garcia
v National Australia Bank’ (1997-98) (4)1 Deakin Law Review 99, 101.
See Part IV of this article.
S39(1) NSWADA.
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persons’. Professor Beth Gaze has queried the aim of antidiscrimination law: 106
What is the aim of anti-discrimination law? Is it, as Creighton suggested, a
prescription for change, encouraging, even requiring, thoroughgoing social
change in order to reduce or eliminate unfair discrimination which to many
seems pervasive in our society? 107 Or is it tokenism, allowing politicians to
claim that discrimination has been dealt with while providing a remedy for
only those few who suffer through the actions of an isolated, clearly
identifiable ‘bad individual’ in what is generally a fair and equitable society.

The reasoning of the Garcia majority is sometimes regarded as a
beneficial development for married women as it formed the basis on
which she could obtain relief from the enforcement of a guarantee in
her husband’s favour. 108 It is also been argued that the ‘special wives’
equity’ in giving special protection to married women offers ‘remedies’
thereby helping them overcome the social, economic and structural
disparities faced by women in relationships. 109 The Australian Law
Reform Commission’s Report - ALRC 69 Equality Before the Law:
Women’s Equality advances this proposition explicitly:
The principle in Yerkey v Jones is narrow and outmoded but nonetheless
is an important remedy for married women [emphasis added]. 110

The riposte to the argument that the Yerkey v Jones Principle is an
important ‘remedy’ is found within the above observation itself; if, as
explicitly conceded by its authors the stereotype of the married woman
is ‘outmoded’ then, adopting Kirby J’s view, the continued acceptance
of the Yerkey v Jones Principle even if it afforded a ‘remedy’ for
married woman should nonetheless be rejected as being an exposition
of principle which is completely inappropriate. 111 We recount that
Kirby J stated in Garcia that marriage, and being the female member to
a marriage, is not, as such, a relevant reason for relief from legal
obligations’. 112 His Honour was thus obviously alive to the argument
106

Beth Gaze, 'Context and Interpretation in Anti Discrimination Law' (2002) 26(2) Melbourne
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that it afforded a ‘remedy’, but nevertheless regarded it to be an
exposition of principle which amounted to ‘unacceptable
discrimination’. 113
In a case that post-dated Garcia by a year, X v The
Commonwealth, 114 the High Court considered the question of whether
the decision to discharge an HIV positive soldier from the Australian
Army amounted to discrimination under s15(2) of the Disability
Discrimination Act. 1992 (Cth) 115 The Army had resisted the
application for relief on the basis that the decision to discharge the
soldier was that because of his disability, he was unable to carry out the
inherent requirements of his employment. Kirby J, who dissented,
opined inter alia that the decision was based on a stereotyped
assumption that HIV positive persons would be unable to perform the
inherent requirements of their employment in the Army and made the
following observation which was central to his reasoning: 116 ‘The
fundamental object of the Act is to achieve social change by removing
stereotypes.’ Kirby J’s observation thus adds a useful gloss to his
comments in Garcia a year earlier when he considered that the Yerkey
v Jones Principle should be rejected even though it provided a means to
afford protection to a married woman. 117
Brems and Timmer warn that despite the common belief that only
negative stereotypes are harmful, positive stereotypes may have
‘negative consequences’, 118 because their adoption can also have
consequences in ‘discrimination’. 119 Also, that stereotyping of women,
howsoever apparently beneficial it appears, in reality impedes equality,
and can result in the demeaning of women. 120 The views of Brems and
Timmer are therefore consistent with Kirby J’s views in X v
Commonwealth that a fundamental object of the Disability
Discrimination Act. 1992 (Cth) to achieve social change by removing
stereotypes 121 and in turn consonant also with Creighton’s views of the
aims of anti-discrimination law, to achieve social change. 122
Separately, advocates for the view that the Yerkey v Jones Principle
is a beneficial development for married women 123 might yet argue that
married women might as a group attract the benefit of a ‘special
113
114
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measure’ under Federal anti-discrimination legislation. 124 Relevantly, s
7D of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) provides that:
(1) A person may take special measures for the purpose of achieving
substantive equality between:
…
(b) people who have different marital or relationship statuses;
S7D (2) of that Act provides that a person does not discriminate against
another person by taking ‘special measures’.

In 2018, the Australian Human Rights Commission released Guidelines:
Special measures under the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) (‘the
Guidelines’). 125 The Guidelines explain that ‘special measures are
positive actions used to promote equality for disadvantaged groups’. 126
Further, they ‘encompass a broad and diverse range of actions that are
often focused on the root cause of unequal outcomes’ and ‘aim to
address the underlying inequality.’ 127 Illustrations of ‘special measures’
in the Guidelines include a board’s setting a target of 30% of women to
address the lack of women’s representation, and the establishment of a
special women’s legal services group to support women subjected to
domestic or family violence. 128
The adoption of the special wives’ equity as a special measure under
discrimination law is necessarily predicated on the presumptive
position necessitating such a measure, that it be needed to promote
equality for ‘disadvantaged groups’. 129
The assumption that wives as a group were ‘disadvantaged’ demands
the acceptance of the propositions considered even by advocates of the
Yerkey v Jones Principle to be ‘narrow and outmoded’, 130 and the
adoption of what Kirby J had rejected as ‘unacceptable discrimination’
in Garcia. 131 By this reasoning, the special wives’ equity is not apt to
find expression as a ‘special measure’ under discrimination law. The
position of married women is at least not comparable to the illustrations
of the special measures in the Guidelines, respectively of a board’s
setting a target of 30% of women to address the lack of women’s
representation, and the establishment of a special women’s legal
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services group to support women who have been subjected to domestic
or family violence. 132
S 39 NSWADA, one of the provisions underpinning Kirby J’s argument
that Australia had ‘moved away from irrelevant discrimination’, was also
the central provision in both of Boehringer and Waterhouse.

Kirby J, however, did not refer to either Boehringer or Waterhouse in
Garcia. This is surprising given his personal involvement at least in
Waterhouse, over which he had presided in the New South Wales Court
of Appeal. To take Kirby J’s own argument to a less abstract level of
analysis, it is useful to instantiate his observation that the adoption of
the Yerkey v Jones Principle would lend the Court’s authority to a
‘completely inappropriate’ exposition of principle,
The difficulties experienced by the Tribunal in Waterhouse,
explored on appeal, concerning the precise parameters of conduct
which should be proscribed as marital status discrimination and which
is not so proscribed, were substantially reprised in the difficulties in
trying to authentically identify and apply the Yerkey v Jones Principle.
The location of the fault line in the pair of New South Wales Court of
Appeal cases between conduct which is not marital status
discrimination (Boehringer) and which is (Waterhouse), thus greatly
assists one to identify cases of marital status discrimination and to
differentiate from these, cases in which marital status discrimination
would not necessarily be inferred. Juxtaposing the reasoning in
Boehringer and Waterhouse with that of the Garcia majority, one is then
better informed to determine if the application of the Yerkey v Jones
Principle does in truth give expression to the recognition of and
‘unprincipled discriminatory category’, the category of married women
and their assumed characteristics, proscribed in Waterhouse and

Boehringer.

This article, accordingly, suggests that the persuasiveness of Kirby
J’s views in Garcia would have been fortified if he had himself referred
to Waterhouse and Boehringer, both of which would have furnished
unequivocal jurisprudential grounding for his position. We revisit this
point in the conclusion below, where we prognosticate on the survival
of the Yerkey v Jones Principle. However, here we focus on the location
of the fault line between cases of an authentic application of the Yerkey
v Jones Principle, and those where the search for invalidating factors of
the married woman’s guarantee led elsewhere.
Examples of cases which do give expression to marital status
discrimination include the decision of the Garcia majority and of
Callinan J. Each of the assumptions adopted by them 133 readily fits
within any of the several definitions of a ‘stereotype’ introduced earlier,
132
133
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broadly a generalised view or preconception of a particular group. 134
Particularly appropriate is Evatt J’s explanation that, with women, a
stereotype is an assumption about their status and capabilities. 135
The cases that authentically adopt the reasoning of the Garcia
majority, including State Bank of New South Wales v Chia 136 and Bank
of Western Australia v Abdul, 137 by assuming a stereotype of married
women, fall within the same category as the Garcia majority.
Each of those assumptions would in turn satisfy the ‘formula’ (as
Mahoney JA described it in Boehringer 138) for the finding of marital
status discrimination based on a stereotype. In particular, his
observation that the finding of a stereotype was based not merely on the
status of being married, but the ‘stereotyped characterizations of
persons of particular sex or marital status’, 139 and Priestley JA’s
explanation of the scope of s 39(1A) 140 of the NSWADA, that a
characteristic ‘imputed’ to persons of a particular marital status was a
reference to ‘some particular characteristic which married persons are
generally believed to have whether they have it or not’. 141
Cases where the reasoning is not underpinned by the adoption of a
stereotyped assumption of the characteristics of a married woman,
would on the other hand not be caught by s 39(1A) of the NSWADA
and its contemporary equivalents. Boehringer and Waterhouse together
contain the definitive principles to assist one identify the distinction
between which are and which are not cases of marital status
discrimination. By the same reasoning, cases such as Agripay 142 and
Alirezai,143 whatever their other deficiencies, would not be caught by
the proscription on marital status discrimination as the reasoning in
those cases was not underpinned by the adoption of a stereotypical
assumption of a married woman’s characteristics – at least this cannot
be discerned with confidence – but, rather, at best conflated the
reasoning of the Garcia majority with the need for there to be some
other invalidating factor. 144
Banking is a ‘service’ captured in the NSWADA and the other state
and territory equivalents 145 and, adopting Kirby J’s reasoning, 146 the
special wives’ equity would have been prohibited under those
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146

See Cook and Cusack (n 10) 9; Brems and Timmer (n 11) 1.
See Evatt (n 14) 2.
See Chia (n 53) 597-601.
See Abdul (n 58) [63].
Boehringer (n 12) 18 (per Mahoney JA).
Ibid, citing Phillips v Martin Marietta Corp 400 US 542 (1971) within the case.
As explained, at the time of the case, the content of the section previously found expression
as s 39(1)(c).
Boehringer (n 12) 31.
Byrne (n 44).
Alirezai (n 43).
Byrne (n 44) 11; Alirezai (n 43) 6, 9 [39].
See (n 97).
Garcia (n 3) 427 (per Kirby J).

24

Bond Law Review

(2022)

provisions. The Yerkey v Jones Principle and the reasoning of the
Garcia majority are thus incompatible with contemporary principles of
sex discrimination, a proposition best expressed in Kirby J’s own words,
that it lends authority to an exposition of principle that is completely
inappropriate, and unacceptable as a principle of Australian
contemporary law, namely discrimination law. 147
VI

CONCLUSION – CAN THE YER K EY V JON ES
PRINCIPLE SURVIVE?

This part explores the proposition that the Yerkey v Jones Principle has
not expressly confronted the principles of discrimination law. Kirby J’s
own judgment in Garcia came tantalisingly close to such a
confrontation, but without fully grounding his assertion that the Yerkey
v Jones Principle is incompatible with principles of contemporary
discrimination law by identifying the fault line between cases of marital
discrimination and those which would not be so regarded, his reasoning
loses its potency.
Our search for cases which at least allude to the existence of this
confrontation brought us to Warburton v Whitely, 148 a pre-Garcia
decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal which concerned
itself with the scope of the application of the Yerkey v Jones Principle.
Kirby J was a member of that bench, which also included Clarke JA,
whose views in Waterhouse have also been explored in detail already.
Kirby J in Warburton lamented the ‘survival of rules for special
treatment of women’ 149 and that it ‘perpetuated a stereotype which was
out of harmony with today’s society and conflicted with the
development of statute law with which legal and equitable principles
should keep in step’ 150, but his argument remained at best inchoate as
he did not then even make specific reference to the content of the
‘statute law’, as he himself subsequently did in Garcia. He also did not
refer to Boehringer which the case actually had post-dated. Ultimately,
Kirby J considered himself bound by the Yerkey v Jones Principle, by
saying as follows: 151
It is possible that the High court with a fresh opportunity to review Yerkey,
would refine the principle there stated. … But until the High Court, or the
legislature, do so I do not believe that this court is free to act as the creditors
urge. 152
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Clarke JA in the same case ultimately dissented in the treatment of the
Yerkey Principle in relation to the question of whether the surety need
prove she had no interest in the enterprise or must the lender establish
she did have a substantial interest, but broadly accepted, in words
essentially to the same effect as Kirby J, that he should continue to apply
the Yerkey v Jones Principle as a ‘separate doctrine’. 153
Clarke JA, in a differently constituted bench of the New South
Wales Court of Appeal in Akins v National Australia Bank (‘Akins’) 154
held that if the principles of Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio
were to be applied to a case, there would be ‘no room for resort to the
special rule in Yerkey’ 155 Akins post-dated both Waterhouse and
Boehringer but neither case was referred to.
The actual reasoning in both of Warburton and Akins is of course
academic as a result of Garcia itself and has not been fully set out. The
purpose of mentioning them is not to analyse the veracity of the
reasoning, but simply to recognise that in both cases, despite the
opportunity to do so, neither Kirby J nor Clarke JA, whose roles in the
development of the principles of marital status discrimination in the
New South Wales Court of Appeal have been established, referred to
those principles explicitly. We recount that Kirby J himself in
Warburton went no further than to allude obliquely to the fact that the
survival of the Yerkey v Jones conflicted with ‘the development of
statute law’ 156 without referring expressly to the arguments either in
Waterhouse or Boehringer .
This article suggests that the Yerkey v Jones Principle owes its
present survival to the fact that it has never been confronted with the
full force of the law of marital status discrimination. It would, of course
require the High Court to overrule Garcia. It is suggested that if and
when an opportunity arose for the High Court do so, in the light of full
argument on the incompatibility of the Yerkey v Jones Principle with
principles of marital status discrimination, it is open for it to determine,
consistent with Kirby J’s inchoate argument in Garcia itself, that it
should decline to endorse the Yerkey v Jones Principle for to do so
would, again to use Kirby J’s words, lend authority to a principle
completely unacceptable as a principle of contemporary Australian
law. 157 Given the broad disapprobation of the Yerkey v Jones Principle
as being anachronistic, and the contemporary movement ‘away from
irrelevant discrimination’, 158 it is suggested that the special wives’
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equity will yield if confronted with the principles of marital status
discrimination.

